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INVESTMENT DISPUTES OLTRE LO STATO: 
ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
SEBASTIÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA* 
Abstract: Global Administrative Law is an academic project that attempts to 
describe the emergence of a regulatory space beyond the state and to prescribe 
solutions to the problems it diagnoses through certain normative principles 
like participation, transparency, reasoned decision-making, judicial review, 
accountability, proportionality, and legitimate expectations. In the case of in-
vestment treaty arbitration, the principles advanced by Global Administrative 
Law are akin to the constitutive elements of the fair and equitable treatment 
that international arbitral tribunals have identified in investor-state disputes. 
As classified by international law scholars, these constitutive elements of fair 
and equitable treatment include due process, arbitrariness, non-discrimination, 
vigilance, legitimate expectations, stability and predictability, transparency, 
good faith, and proportionality. Incidentally, some of these principles have 
found conventional support in state practice. This Essay answers the question 
of whether this dogmatic similarity is a mere coincidence or proof of the in-
fluence exerted by the tenets of Global Administrative Law over the way the 
fair and equitable treatment clause has been construed. For that purpose, it 
briefly explains Global Administrative Law, its approach to investment treaty 
arbitration, and the fair and equitable treatment standard of international in-
vestment law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Global Administrative Law (GAL) is arguably the most influential 
doctrine recently proposed as an alternative to international law. It essential-
ly affirms that there is a law that is applicable to processes of an administra-
tive character, which involve legal and political structures that exceed those 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2018, Sebastián López Escarcena. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate professor at the Faculty of Law of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 
and associate fellow/membre associé at the Centre for Global Governance Studies of the 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, and at the Research Institute in International and Euro-
pean Law of the Université Paris 1 “Panthéon-Sorbonne,” France. PhD (Edinburgh); LLM (Lei-
den); Abogado (Chile); LLB, BA (Catholic University, Chile). Email: rlopeze@uc.cl. This Essay 
is part of a research project financed by the Chilean National Fund for the Development of Sci-
ence and Technology (FONDECYT or Fondo Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la 
Tecnología): FONDECYT Regular Nº 1150302. 
2686 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2685 
of a purely intrastate nature. Kate Miles summarized its endeavors as fol-
lows: 
The term itself embodies an investigation into the nature and con-
nections between forms of transnational regulation, international 
institutions, private industry standards, international review 
mechanisms, transnational networks, new actors on the interna-
tional plane and the emergence of shared administrative law prin-
ciples within these forms of governance. Its particular focus is on 
the legal mechanisms, principles, and practices that address issues 
of transparency, public participation, accountability, and review 
within national administrative law systems and at the global level. 
It is concerned with issues of legitimacy, power, good govern-
ance, and democracy.1 
GAL was born to study regulations partially ignored by international 
law. Concurrently promoted by North America and Western Europe, at pre-
sent its strongest branches are in the United States and Italy. This might 
surprise most scholars trained in the Civil Law tradition, but not Italian 
lawyers, many of whom know Santi Romano’s (1875–1947) work on law 
beyond the state—or oltre lo stato.2 Both the North American and Western 
European prongs of GAL have analyzed the procedural practice of global 
bodies from the perspective of adjective principles like transparency, rea-
soned decision-making, judicial review, and accountability, and sometimes 
of substantive principles like proportionality, and respect for legitimate ex-
pectations. From this perspective, GAL is not only aimed at describing cer-
tain phenomena, but also at prescribing solutions to what it perceives as 
problems, in the form of normative principles. In this attempt, GAL scholar-
ship covers several areas of comparative and international law. Regarding 
investment treaty arbitration, it has criticized the democratic deficit of in-
vestor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). 
To improve ISDS’ lack of legitimacy, GAL has proposed using the 
above-mentioned principles in different ways. Interestingly enough, these 
principles are very similar to those constitutive elements of the fair and eq-
uitable treatment (“FET”) standard that ISDS case law has identified, and 
that international legal scholars have classified as the general requirement 
                                                                                                                           
 1 KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRON-
MENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 331–32 (2015) [hereinafter THE ORIGINS OF INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW]; see also Kate Miles, International Investment Law and Univer-
sality: Histories of Shape-Shifting, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 986, 1008 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter Miles, International Investment Law]. 
2 See generally SANTI ROMANO, SCRITTI MINORI (1950) [hereinafter SCRITTI MINORI]. 
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of due process: the prohibition of arbitrariness; the duty of non-
discrimination; the obligation of vigilance; the respect of legitimate expec-
tation; the duties of stability and predictability; the obligation of transparen-
cy; the general principle of good faith, and, more recently, that of propor-
tionality. Some of these constitutive elements, developed in veritable in-
vestment disputes oltre lo stato, have even been included in last-generation 
bilateral investment treaties (BIT) or investment chapters of economic inte-
gration agreements (EIA), such as free trade agreements (FTA). But, can we 
thank or blame GAL for any of this? The present Essay answers this ques-
tion. It analyzes the general premises of GAL and its take on investment 
treaty arbitration, before turning to the dogmatics of FET and examining 
how its case law relates to GAL’s principles. 
 Part I offers an introduction to GAL.3 Part II examines international 
investment treaties from the standpoint of GAL.4 Part III discusses FET, as 
part of the international minimum standard offered by BIT and the invest-
ment chapters of EIA.5 Finally, Part IV analyzes whether FET, as currently 
applied, has been somehow influenced by GAL.6  
I. WHAT IS GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart defined GAL in 
their 2005 framing article for the project on the topic promoted by New 
York University.7 According to them, GAL comprises of “the mechanisms, 
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or 
affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by 
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, rea-
                                                                                                                           
3 See infra notes 7–31, and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 32–55, and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 56–83, and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 84–118, and accompanying text. 
 7 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administra-
tive Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 16–18 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury et al., The Emer-
gence of GAL]; see Global Administrative Law—Project, INST. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE, 
https://www.iilj.org/gal/project/ [https://perma.cc/4NX8-4MWN] (introducing the GAL Project 
and Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart). The term GAL was coined in 2002, in a symposium of the 
Administrative Law Review. Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Scholarship, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 548, 549 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2016) 
[hereinafter RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW]. Kingsbury, Krisch and 
Stewart´s paper has been translated into French and Spanish. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico 
Krisch & Richard Stewart, L’Emergence d’un Droit Administratif Global, in UN DROIT ADMIN-
ISTRATIF GLOBAL? / A GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 335 (Clémentine Bories ed., 2012) [here-
inafter UN DROIT ADMINISTRATIF GLOBAL?]; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stew-
art, El Surgimiento del Derecho Administrativo Global, 24 REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO DE LA 
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES, COLOMBIA 4 (2010).  
2688 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2685 
soned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules 
and decisions they make.”8 As its name indicates, rather than international, 
GAL is both global and administrative in nature. This means, first, that 
GAL offers analytical tools to address the problems that arise out of global-
ization, taken not from international law, but from administrative law (‘ad-
ministrative’).9 Second, that it includes new sources and subjects to the tra-
ditional lists of international law (‘global’).10 Concerning sources, besides 
public international law, GAL encompasses a renewed version of jus genti-
um, described as a type of lex mercatoria; a so-called international public 
law that governs the exercise of this kind of authority; domestic public or 
administrative law, from a comparative perspective; and the norms generat-
ed by autonomous systems.11 With regard to subjects, GAL studies formal 
intergovernmental organizations, which are international institutions par 
excellence, such as the United Nations (U.N.) or the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS); hybrid public-private organizations or purely private enti-
ties that exercise public authority, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO); transgovernmental and transnational networks, 
which are less structured forms of governance between states, international 
organizations and/or other actors, like the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision; and more complex forms of governance, such as global hybrid, 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 17. 
 9 Id. at 16–18; see Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, Global Administrative Law, in 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 10–19 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 
2011) [hereinafter MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA]; see also Lorenzo Casini, Beyond Drip-
Painting? Ten Years of GAL and the Emergence of a Global Administration, 13 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 473, 473–74, 477 (2015) [hereinafter Casini, Beyond Drip-Painting]; Casini, supra note 7, at 
548–53, 555–56. 
 10 See Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance, 99 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143, 144 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury, The Administrative Law]; see also 
Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 669–70 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Administrative Law Without]; 
Sabino Cassese, Global Administrative Law: The State of the Art, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 465, 466 
(2015) [hereinafter Cassese, Global Administrative Law]; Kingsbury & Donaldson, supra note 9, 
§ 1; Benedict Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration—National and Transna-
tional Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005) [herein-
after Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration]; Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept 
of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25–26 (2009) [hereinafter Kings-
bury, The Concept of ‘Law’]; Benedict Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory Rules and Deci-
sions in National Courts, 1 ACTA JURIDICA 90, 92 (2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Weighing 
Global Regulatory]; Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and 
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2006).  
 11 See Kingsbury & Donaldson, supra note 9, §§ 20–25; Kingsbury, The Administrative Law, 
supra note 10, at 146–49; Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 29–31; 
Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory, supra note 10, at 92–93; see also Kingsbury, The Con-
cept of ‘Law,’ supra note 10, at 52–55. 
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multi-level or informal regulatory regimes, including the decision-making 
procedures for fisheries in the World Heritage Convention.12 
As an academic theory and project, GAL has proven to be highly suc-
cessful. To some degree, this is due to its use of the word de mode “global,” 
and for its pragmatic and casuistic approach. It has also been criticized, and 
sometimes rightly so.13 Among other issues, questions have been raised as 
to its lack of dogmatic novelty and of clear analytical boundaries, and the 
needless use of the fashionable term GAL in many scholarly publications.14 
Nevertheless, within a few years GAL has become a proper school of legal 
thought, with one main branch in North America and another one in West-
ern Europe.15 These informal chapters have developed concurrently, but 
with certain differences. For instance, GAL scholarship in the United States 
has focused on the procedural part, but in Italy, France, and Spain, the sub-
stantive side has been favored.16 Interestingly enough, of all the countries in 
Western Europe where GAL has received scholarly attention, it is Italy 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Casini, Beyond Drip-Painting, supra note 9, at 475–77; see also Kingsbury et al., 
Global Governance as Administration, supra note 10, at 5; Kingsbury, The Administrative Law, 
supra note 10, at 143–48; Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 16–27, 31–
37; Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 2–5; Richard Stewart, The Global Regulatory Chal-
lenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 699–703 (2005) [hereinafter 
Stewart, The Global Regulatory]; Richard Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global 
Administrative Law?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63–68 (2005) [hereinafter Stewart, U.S. 
Administrative Law].   
 13 See generally B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative 
Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 (2005) (criticizing GAL from the perspective of the Third 
World Approaches to International Law, better known by its acronym of TWAIL). 
 14 See, e.g., Clémentine Bories, Histoire des Phénomènes Administratifs au-delà de la Sphère 
Étatique: Tâtonnements et Hésitations du Droit et/ou de la Doctrine, in UN DROIT ADMINISTRAT-
IF GLOBAL?, supra note 7, at 25, 49–50; Laurence Dubin, Le Droit Administratif Global, Analyse 
Critique de son Existence et son Articulation avec le Droit International Public, in UN DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF GLOBAL?, supra note 7, at 95, 101–06; Mathias Forteau, Le Droit Administratif 
Global, Signe d’une Evolution des Techniques du Droit International?, in UN DROIT ADMIN-
ISTRATIF GLOBAL?, supra note 7, at 169, 178–83; Casini, supra note 7, at 563. See generally Jo-
seph Weiler, GAL at a Crossroads: Preface to the Symposium, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 463 (2015). 
 15 See Antoine Guilmain, Du Droit Cosmopolitique au Droit Global: Pour une Rupture Epis-
temologique dans L’approche Juridique, 26 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INT’L 219, 231–34 
(2014); Daniel Mockle, Le Debat sur les Principes et les Fondements du Droit Administratif 
Global, 53 CAHIERS DE DROIT 3, 5–10 (2012). See generally Casini, supra note 7. Authors in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania have also written about GAL. See, e.g., Dave Gunton et 
al., A Global Administrative Law Bibliography, 68 L. & CONTEM. PROBS. 357 (2005); see also GAL 
Bibliography, INST. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE, http://www.iilj.org/gal/resources/bibliography/ 
[https://perma.cc/RL47-LCX8] (providing a bibliography of GAL); GAL Publications, ISTITUTO 
DI RICERCHE SULLA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE, http://www.irpa.eu/en/gal-publications 
[https://perma.cc/3QZ6-4LZW]. 
 16 See Casini, supra note 7, at 555–60. 
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where it has flourished the most.17 Why has such a loose legal doctrine like 
GAL been so well received by the largely theoretical Italian legal scholar-
ship? The answer to this question can be found in Santi Romano’s writings. 
In 1917, he inaugurated the academic year of the Institute of Political and 
Social Sciences of Italy with a speech titled Oltre lo Stato.18 In it, Romano 
talked about the survival of guilds, labor unions and other associations of 
individuals outside the state-centered law then dominant in Europe and 
elsewhere in the Civil Law tradition.19 That same year, he published his 
opus magna: L’Ordinamento Guiridico.20 
In this book, Romano departed from a simple, yet striking premise. If 
the legal maxim ubi societas ibi ius, ubi ius ibi societas is true, then law 
presupposes an organized social order, and vice versa. Hence, law is more 
than just a simple set of norms—it is an institution. In Romano’s view, law 
emerges when a social group passes from an inorganic or unorganized 
phase to an organic or organized one. This passage from one phase to an-
other is called institutionalization. In other words, an institution is a society 
that has achieved order via an organization. From this standpoint, any so-
cially organized force could qualify as a legal order. This means that law 
does not necessarily derive from the state.21  
Only somewhat known in the English-speaking world, Romano has 
exerted a strong influence in Italian public law scholarship.22 Sabino 
Cassese published in 2006 a book titled after Romano’s 1917 lecture.23 
                                                                                                                           
 17 The GAL casebook offers a good overview of this approach. See generally GLOBAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CASEBOOK (Sabino Cassese et al. eds., 2012). Each year, a GAL semi-
nar is organized in Viterbo, Italy. For more on Italian GAL scholarship, see Casini, supra note 7, 
at 556–58. 
 18 Later published in SCRITTI MINORI, supra note 2. 
 19 See generally SCRITTI MINORI, supra note 2. 
 20 See generally SANTI ROMANO, L’ORDINAMENTO GUIRIDICO (1917) [hereinafter 
L’ORDINAMIENTO]. This book was later translated to Spanish, French, German and Portuguese. 
See generally SANTI ROMANO, DIE RECHTSORDNUNG (1975); SANTI ROMANO, EL ORDENA-
MIENTO JURÍDICO (1963); SANTI ROMANO, L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE (1975); SANTI ROMANO, O OR-
DENAMENTO JURIDICO (2008). 
 21 See Norbert Bobbio, TEORIA GENERALE DEL DIRITTO 8–9 (1993). See generally 
L’ORDINAMIENTO, supra note 20. 
 22 See Rafael García Pérez, Intro. to PAOLO GROSSI, DE LA CODIFICACIÓN A LA GLOBALIZA-
CIÓN DEL DERECHO (2010). One hundred years after it was originally published in Italy, Roma-
no´s book was translated to English. SANTI ROMANO, THE LEGAL ORDER (2017). See generally 
Paolo Grossi, Santi Romano: Un Messaggio da Ripensare nella Odierna Crisi delle Fonti, 60 
RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 377 (2006) (discussing Santi Romano); 
Filippo Fontanelli, Santi Romano and L’Ordinamento Giuridico: The Relevance of a Forgotten 
Masterpiece for Contemporary International, Transnational and Global Legal Relations, 2 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 67 (2011). 
 23 SABINO CASSESE, OLTRE LO STATO (2006) [hereinafter OLTRE LO STATO]. This book was 
later translated to French. See generally SABINO CASSESE, AU-DELÁ DE L’ETAT (2011). 
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Cassese’s Oltre lo Stato examines the precarious globalization of law of the 
last decades, analyzing different ways in which the phenomenon of law be-
yond the state manifests itself internationally and the challenges that this 
new reality presents, both theoretically and practically.24 This was not 
Cassese’s first reference to Romano’s work. In 2002, he published a book 
called La Crisi dello Stato, an overt allusion to Romano’s inaugural lecture 
of the 1909 academic year at the University of Pisa: Lo Stato Moderno e la 
sua Crisi.25 
Despite differences in their approaches, the North American and West-
ern European prongs of GAL normally concur that every exercise of author-
ity that has an impact on public or private actors must be studied.26 In their 
first publications, GAL scholars started analyzing international organiza-
tions from the new perspective offered, examining the procedural practice 
of global bodies from the standpoint of particular adjective principles like 
participation, transparency, reasoned decision-making, judicial review, and 
accountability.27 Kingsbury’s notion of ‘publicness,’ meaning the public 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See generally OLTRE LO STATO, supra note 23. Romano’s lasting impression on Italian 
Scholarship can be seen in some of the titles of Giacinto della Cananea’s publications. GIACINTO 
DELLA CANANEA, DUE PROCESS OF LAW BEYOND THE STATE: REQUIREMENTS OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE (2016) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS OF LAW]; Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the 
State: the Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUR. PUB. L. 
563 (2003); Giacinto della Cananea, Procedural Due Process of Law Beyond the State, in THE 
EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: ADVANCING INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE EXERCISE 
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS]. For more on della Cananea’s interest-
ing work on the procedural principles of comparative public law see, for example, Giacinto della 
Cananea, Minimum Standards of Procedural Justice in Administrative Adjudication, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) [here-
inafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW]; Giacinto della 
Cananea, The Genesis and Structure of General Principles of Global Public Law, in GLOBAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RELATIONSHIPS, LEGAL ISSUES AND 
COMPARISON (Edoardo Chiti & Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella eds., 2011). 
 25 SABINO CASSESE, LA CRISI DELLO STATO (2002). Romano’s lecture was later included in 
a book of his works. SANTI ROMANO, Lo Stato Moderno e la sua Crisi, in SCRITTI MINORI, supra 
note 2. 
 26 See Jean d’Aspremont, Droit Administratif Global et Droit International, in UN DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF GLOBAL?, supra note 7, at 83, 88–90. 
 27 See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 114–16, 120 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Global Standards]. See gen-
erally Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of Interna-
tional Organizations Law, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 319 (2009); Cassese, Administrative Law With-
out, supra note 10; Stewart, The Global Regulatory, supra note 12; Stewart, U.S. Administrative 
Law, supra note 12. Later, substantive principles like proportionality, and respect for expectations, 
were included in these studies, but merely in an exceptional and incidental manner. See, e.g., 
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 40–41; see also Cassese, Global Stand-
ards, supra, at 110–11, 120–21, 125–26 (exploring the relationship between domestic and interna-
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character that a given regulatory regime must have for it to be considered 
part of GAL, supplemented the comparatively weak substantive nature of 
GAL. In his view, the principles that compose this notion are, inter alia, 
legality, rationality, proportionality, rule of law, and respect for human 
rights.28 The application of these principles to the decision-making process 
of international organizations, especially those of an adjective character, is 
arguably GAL’s main contribution to legal literature.29 For it, GAL can be 
portrayed not only as a descriptive project, but also a prescriptive one.30 In 
other words, it is a normative endeavor that conceives global or transnation-
al governance as administration or regulation.31 
II. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATIONS FROM GAL’S PERSPECTIVE 
In spite of its apparent originality, GAL is but one of the many at-
tempts to replace the notion of international law. An early example of these 
efforts is Wilfred Jenks’ (1909–1973) common law of mankind, which em-
phasized the relevance of individuals and non-legal entities in international 
law. 32 Because Jenks’ theory was ultimately about an international commu-
nity governed by the rule of law, it can be regarded as a form of constitu-
tionalism.33 Considering its final objective, the common law of mankind is 
                                                                                                                           
tional law); Cassese, Administrative Law Without, supra note 10, at 684–87 (exploring the same 
relationship); Kingsbury, The Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 144, 146–47, 149. 
 28 As stated by Kingsbury, the principle of legality means that the actors within a system must 
act in accordance to its rules; the principle of rationality is related to that of reasoned decision-
making; the rule of law has a procedural nature; and the respect of human rights refers to the sub-
stantial content that is not covered by the notion of rule of law. Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law,’ 
supra note 10, at 31–33; Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory, supra note 10, at 113–18. 
 29 See Casini, Beyond Drip-Painting, supra note 9, at 474. 
 30 See, e.g., René Fernando Urueña Hernandez, Global Administrative Law and the Global 
South, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 392; Du-
bin, supra note 14, at 93–98. 
 31 Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 10, at 2–5; Kingsbury, 
The Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 143, 147–53; Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, 
supra note 7, at 15–20, 25–31, 42–53; Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory, supra note 10, at 
92; Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 5–10; Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law, supra note 12, 
at 63–64, 71–73; see Richard Stewart, The Normative Dimensions and Performance of Global 
Administrative Law, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 499, 500–02 (2015) (discussing the “normative bene-
fits” of GAL). See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014). 
 32 See generally C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958). Jenks later 
restated and developed some of his ideas on the issue in other publications. See generally C. 
WILFRED JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW (1969); C. WILFRED JENKS, THE WORLD BEYOND THE 
CHARTER (1968); C. WILFRED JENKS, LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1967) C. WILFRED 
JENKS, FREEDOM AND WELFARE (1963). 
 33 See generally Guy Fiti Sinclair, The Common Law of Mankind: C. Wilfred Jenks’ Constitu-
tional Vision (Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, No. 3/16, 2016), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.
org/wp-content/uploads/JMWP-03-Sinclair.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SDD-DFN9]. With regard to con-
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not essentially different from Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) cosmopolitan 
law; Philip Jessup’s (1897–1986) transnational law; Harold Berman’s 
(1918–2007) world law; Rafael Domingo’s new global law; and Antonio 
Cançado Trindade’s new ius gentium.34 Besides these individual attempts to 
find an alternative to international law, other collective undertakings have, 
in some cases, become proper schools of legal thought. Standing out among 
them, are the New Haven School of International Law and the recent pro-
jects on the Exercise of International Public Authority (IPA) of the Max 
Planck Institute in Heidelberg, Germany, and on Informal International 
Lawmaking (“IN-LAW”) of The Hague Institute for the Internationalization 
of Law.35 From all these academic efforts, transnational law, world law, and 
new ius gentium are of a largely descriptive character.36 Furthermore, some 
of these academic initiatives have a solely top-down approach, like the 
common law of mankind, the New Haven School, world law, constitutional-
ism, new global law and new ius gentium. Others combine approaches from 
above with those from below, like cosmopolitan law, transnational law, IPA, 
and IN-LAW. 
In this context, GAL can be characterized as a descriptive-prescriptive 
project operating both top-down and bottom-up.37As Kingsbury, Krisch, 
                                                                                                                           
stitutionalism, see ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 85–91 (2012). For more contemporary scholarship on constitutionalism, see HERMANN MOS-
LER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY (1980); Erika de Wet, The Emergence 
of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Con-
stitutional Order, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 611 (2006); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimen-
sion of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1 
(1997); Thomas Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, in LIBER AMICORUM TONO EITEL 95 
(Jochen Frowein et al eds., 2003); Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or 
Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195 (1993). 
 34 See generally RAFAEL DOMINGO, ¿QUÉ ES EL DERECHO GLOBAL? (2008); PHILIP JESSUP, 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); IMMANUEL KANT, ZUM EWIGEN FRIEDEN: EIN PHILOSOPHISCHER 
ENTWURF (1795); ANTONIO CANÇADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HUMANKIND: 
TOWARDS A NEW JUS GENTIUM (2010); Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1617 (1994). Kant and Domingo’s books have been translated to English. See generally RAFAEL 
DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (2010); IMMANUEL KANT, ‘TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE’ 
AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY (2006). 
 35 See generally HAROLD LASSWELL & MYRES MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE 
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992); THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24; INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 
(Joost Pauwelyn et al. eds., 2012). 
 36 Cosmopolitan law, the common law of mankind, the New Haven School, constitutionalism, 
new global law, IPA, and IN-LAW are of a descriptive-prescriptive nature, instead. They share a 
normative intention expressed in the form of certain legal principles, offered as solutions to the 
problems identified in the respective legal diagnostic mode. 
 37 In theory the former is possible; however, it is not recommended for GAL. Thus, in prac-
tice, only the latter is a possibility. 
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and Stewart said in their influential 2005 paper, the top-down approach 
“would more closely resemble contemporary international law patterns.”38 
For this reason, it would suffer from a more accentuated democratic deficit 
than one based on the domestic fora: i.e., on comparative law.39 And this 
would surely be an issue, for GAL proposes a way of analyzing and eventu-
ally overcoming the lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
several organs of the global administrative space, where the national-
international and public-private distinctions are not applicable.40 For this 
purpose, it offers a number of mostly procedural principles, which include 
participation, transparency, reasoned decision-making, judicial review and 
accountability in general, as well as some substantive principles, like pro-
portionality and respect for legitimate expectations, on the other.41 The 
global administrative space proposed by GAL is, thus, a binary order. That 
is, one in which different legal systems or jura particularia coexist with a 
group of common principles or jus commune, much like local laws did in 
Europe with vulgarized Roman Law during the Middle Ages.42 This coex-
istence of a jura particularia with a jus commune would be made possible 
by the emerging global polity, where GAL has developed and now oper-
ates.43 
GAL scholarship has dealt with ISDS. The so-called GAL manifesto of 
2005 already talked about “the far-reaching arbitral review established un-
der investment treaties,” by which “investors can challenge administrative 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 57. 
 39 Id.; see also Stewart, The Global Regulatory, supra note 12, at 506; Stewart, U.S. Adminis-
trative Law, supra note 12, at 72–73, 88–107. 
 40 Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 23–27; see also Kingsbury et al., 
Global Governance as Administration, supra note 10, at 2–5; Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law,’ 
supra note 10, at 24–26; Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory, supra note 10, at 91; Krisch & 
Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 1–5, 10–13; Stewart, The Global Regulatory, supra note 12, at 703–
09; Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law, supra note 12, at 68–71. 
 41 See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 16–17, 26–29, 37–42; 
see also Cassese, Administrative Law Without, supra note 10, at 684–94; Cassese, Global Stand-
ards, supra note 27, at 110–11, 120–21, 125–26; Kingsbury & Donaldson, supra note 9, §§ 10, 
26–54; Kingsbury, The Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 143, 146–47; Kingsbury, The Con-
cept of ‘Law,’ supra note 10, at 23–26, 41–50; Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory, supra 
note 10, at 92. For a discussion of GAL and accountability, see David Dyzenhaus, Accountability 
and the Concept of (Global) Administrative Law, 1 ACTA JURIDICA 3 (2009), Nico Krisch, The 
Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247 (2006); Mockle, supra note 15, 
at 23–27. 
 42 See Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 973, 986–90, 
992–93 (2006); see also OLTRE LO STATO, supra note 23, at 104; Cassese, Global Administrative 
Law, supra note 10, at 468. 
 43 See Edoardo Chiti, Where Does GAL Find Its Legal Grounding?, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
486, 489–90 (2015). See generally SABINO CASSESE, THE GLOBAL POLITY: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 
OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012). 
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action of the host-state before international arbitral tribunals if they believe 
their rights under the relevant investment treaty have been violated.”44 As 
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart said in their well-known paper: “Increasing-
ly, decisions of these tribunals have extended procedural, as well as substan-
tive, limitations on domestic regulators. This gives investors a very power-
ful tool, probably not always balanced by sufficient representation of public 
and other interests.”45 That same year, Sabino Cassese had already men-
tioned the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID) as “[a] type of global organization [that] is comprised of neither states, 
nor of lower level, sub-state entities, but of other global organizations, act-
ing alone or together.”46 According to him, what this international organiza-
tion offers is judicial review via arbitral panels. In his opinion, this situation 
raises several questions: 
[W]ho ensures legal protection for those affected by such deci-
sions? National courts or judicial bodies belonging to the global 
legal system? If it is the latter, does the complainant have the 
same rights as it would in a national court? What relationship 
ought to be established between national courts and global tribu-
nals, when global administrative decisions are not the exclusive 
product of global institutions, but originate in joint, global-
national, decisions?47 
Richard Stewart insisted upon the GAL nature of ISDS in two different 
articles, published in 2005.48 Cassese did the same in Oltre lo Stato, a year 
later, and so did Kingsbury in 2009, in a few papers.49 Gus Van Harten has 
offered a good depiction of ISDS as a type of GAL. In an article written 
with Martin Loughlin, and published in 2006, the authors asserted that in-
vestment treaty arbitration is an exemplary species of GAL: 
Since the late 1960s, and especially in the 1990s, states have con-
sented to an international regime in which foreign investors (read, 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 36. Lorenzo Casini referred to 
their paper as the “GAL manifesto.” See Casini, supra note 7, at 551, 554–55. 
 45 Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of GAL, supra note 7, at 36–37, 46–47; see Kingsbury, 
The Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 153. 
 46 Cassese, Administrative Law Without, supra note 10, at 674, 675–76, 678.  
 47 Id. at 692. 
 48 See Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law, supra note 12, at 67, 94, 102–03, 104; see also 
Stewart, The Global Regulatory, supra note 12, at 696–97, 699, 701–02, 708–09, 710–11, 738, 
741–43, 751–53, 756–57. 
 49 OLTRE LO STATO, supra note 23, at 48, 50, 60; Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law,’ supra 
note 10, at 31–33; Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory, supra note 10, at 107–09; see also 
Kingsbury & Donaldson, supra note 9, § 30. 
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multinational enterprises) are granted the ability to make and en-
force international claims against states in disputes arising from 
the state’s regulation of investor assets. The arrangements for pur-
suing these claims are in certain crucial respects unusual. Four 
specific features should be highlighted. First, such claims are 
commonly not subject to customary limitations that apply to indi-
vidual claims under other types of treaties, including the duty of 
an individual to exhaust local remedies . . . . Secondly, under in-
vestment treaties, investors can directly bring claims for damages, 
awarded as a public law remedy . . . . Thirdly, because investment 
treaties incorporate the procedural framework and enforcement 
structure of international commercial arbitration, investors can di-
rectly seek enforcement of the awards of arbitration tribunals be-
fore the domestic courts of a large number of countries, with lim-
ited judicial supervision by domestic courts . . . . Finally, invest-
ment treaties facilitate forum-shopping by investors, through the 
selective establishment of holding companies, thus expanding the 
reach of investment arbitration as an international mechanism of 
adjudicative review . . . . The effect of this combination of fea-
tures, uniquely present in investment arbitration, is to subject the 
regulatory conduct of states to control through compulsory inter-
national adjudication to an unusual extent. And it is precisely be-
cause of the potential of these internationally generated adjudica-
tive norms and mechanisms to exert a strong disciplinary influ-
ence over domestic administrative programmes that investment 
arbitration should be seen to constitute a powerful species of 
global administrative law.50 
In their paper, Van Harten and Loughlin concluded that, viewed as 
such, “the investment arbitration tribunal must be treated as a semi-
autonomous international adjudicative body that reviews and controls state 
conduct in the public sphere.”51 A year after stating this, Van Harten reiter-
ated his ideas on ISDS in a book, but instead as a sort of regulatory review-
ing option for foreign investors that is intrinsically biased in their favor as it 
currently stands. This “businessman’s court” as he called ISDS, lacks the 
four criteria of any public law adjudication: accountability, openness, co-
herence and independence. Consequently, Van Harten concluded, ISDS 
needs to be reformed so as to recover its public law roots, by means of the 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 122 (2006). 
 51 Id. at 149. 
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establishment of an international investment court.52 This desire of return-
ing to public law is at the heart of GAL.53 It is also at the core of IPA and 
the Lex Mercatoria Publica Project.54 Led by Stephen Schill, this initiative 
reaffirms that ISDS is a mechanism of global regulatory governance, not 
just a means of settling individual disputes. Arbitrators exercise public au-
thority, mainly by reviewing the legality of state conduct and performing 
law-making functions in disputes between private and public actors, without 
the safeguards that characterize domestic public law adjudication, such as 
procedural transparency, third-party participation, limitations on damages as 
a remedy, etc. And this raises questions of legitimacy for ISDS. According 
to this project, the body of law that investment treaty arbitration generates is 
somehow akin to lex mercatoria, the anational law produced by arbitral tri-
bunals in international controversies of an exclusively private nature. Being 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 
(2007); Daniel Kalderimis, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Global Administrative Law: What 
This Might Mean in Practice, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 
145 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). Unexpectedly, Van Harten does not mention GAL 
at all in his book. He later insisted on the biased nature of these international adjudicative bodies 
that provide ISDS. See generally Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural 
Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC 
LAW, supra note 24, at 627. For more on his approach to ISDS, see GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVER-
EIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION (2013). For a summary of this and other critical views to investment treaties and 
ISDS see, for example, JOSÉ ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 75–94 (2011) and JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PRO-
TECTION UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 21–39 (2014). 
 53 Other advocates of public law approaches to ISDS include Santiago Montt and Andreas 
Kulick. See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRA-
TION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009); 
KULICK, supra note 33. Some scholars have questioned this type of analysis. See, e.g., VALENTI-
NA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 188–207 (2016) 
[hereinafter ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL]; José E. Alvarez, ‘Beware: Boundary Crossings’—A 
Critical Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to International Investment Law, 17 J. WORLD INV. 
& TRADE 171, 181–91, 215–27 (2016); THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 
supra note 1, at 332–35. See generally José E. Alvarez, Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public?,’ 7 
J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 534 (2016); Miles, International Investment Law, supra note 1. 
 54 IPA has questioned GAL, though. For instance, Armin von Bogdandy has said that it 
blends international law and administrative law, without taking into account the fact that the legit-
imacy of origin is fundamentally different in international and domestic legal norms, for the for-
mer are grounded in state consent, while the latter in popular sovereignty. See Armin von Bog-
dandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework 
for Global Governance Activities, in THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 3, 24–25; see also Armin von Bogdandy, General Principles of 
International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, in THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AU-
THORITY BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 727, 738–41; cf. Sabino Cassese, Is 
There a Global Administrative Law?, in THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 761, 772–76 [hereinafter Cassese, Is There a GAL?]. 
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ultimately aimed at formulating principles for ISDS, this academic project 
can also be characterized as descriptive-prescriptive in nature.55 
III. DOGMATICS OF THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD 
Investment treaties currently provide for an international minimum 
standard composed of different protections for aliens against political risk in 
host-states.56 These protections include some with a certain pedigree in in-
ternational law—the clauses on lawful expropriation, and on national and 
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment.57 Investment treaties also incorpo-
rate newer provisions that are specific to international investment law: arbi-
trary, unreasonable or discriminatory measures; full protection and security; 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance 
Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest—The Concept of Propor-
tionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 24, 
at 75 [hereinafter Kingsbury & Schill, Public Law Concepts]; STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTI-
LATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2009) [hereinafter THE MULTILAT-
ERALIZATION]; Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Govern-
ance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative 
Law, in EL NUEVO DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO GLOBAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA 221 (Benedict 
Kingsbury et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration]; Stephan 
W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodologi-
cal Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57 (2011); Stephan W. Schill, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 24, at 151 [hereinafter Schill, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment]; Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion and Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1083 (2011) [hereinafter Schill, System-Building]. 
 56 Such risk includes potential state-interference with the property of aliens, based on ideolog-
ical hostility towards foreign investment, nationalism, and changes in industry patterns and the 
orientation of domestic state policies. See SEBASTIÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, INDIRECT EXPROPRIA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 114, 120, 203–08 (2014); see also PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. 
STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK at xvii (1997); SABRINA ROBERT-CUENDET, DROITS DE 
L’INVESTISSEUR ÉTRANGER ET PROTECTION DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT: CONTRIBUTION À 
L’ANALYSE DE L’EXPROPRIATION INDIRECT 101–02 (2010); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW 
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 26–29, 285 (2010); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 69–79 (2010); THE MULTILATERALIZATION, supra note 55, at 3; cf. 
FRANCISCO GONZÁLEZ DE COSSÍO, ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 6–7 (2009) [hereinafter ARBITRAJE 
DE INVERSIÓN]; Cédric Dupont, Thomas Schultz & Merih Angin, Political Risk and Investment 
Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 136, 138 n.8 (2016). 
 57 See, e.g., ARNAUD DE NANTEUIL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE L’INVESTISSEMENT 306–30, 
358–84 (2017); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 98–120, 198–212 (2012); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 147–232, 321–98 
(2009); KENNETH VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION 271–309, 339–86 (2010) [hereinafter BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES]; 
SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 245–55, 285–328; SORNARAJAH, supra note 56, at 335–45, 363–452; 
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 29–86, 151–204 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) [herein-
after STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION].  
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the so-called umbrella clause; free transfer of funds; and, of course, FET.58 
The breach of these stipulations, either individually or collectively, will en-
gage the international responsibility of the state.59 Most of these protections, 
if not all, are a common feature of BITs, and of the investment chapters of 
EIAs, like FTAs. Almost three decades after an international tribunal under 
the auspices of ICSID settled an investment treaty arbitration for the first 
time, the ever-growing ISDS case law has transformed these protections 
into discrete standards.60 Although an unlawful expropriation continues to 
be the most severe form of interference that any investor can suffer, it is 
relatively uncommon and not easy to prove when it actually occurs.61 For 
this reason, claimants have turned to a younger protection: FET.62 
This standard first appeared in Article 11(2) of the 1948 Charter for an 
International Trade Organization, better known as the Havana Charter. That 
same year, the Ninth International Conference of American States adopted 
the Economic Agreement of Bogotá. Its Article 22 provided for equitable 
treatment. After both agreements failed to enter into force, the United States 
included the term in its friendship, commerce and navigation treaties 
(“FCN”), the forerunners of BITs. Today, FET is usually found within the 
substantive provisions of BITs and FTAs, concluded and in force world-
wide.63  
                                                                                                                           
 58 See, e.g., DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 334–58, 384–93; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra 
note 57, at 130–97, 212–15; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 233–319, 399–479; 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 189–271, 316–35, 387–94, 508–15; SALA-
CUSE, supra note 56, at 205–44, 256–84, 329–39; SORNARAJAH, supra note 56, at 349–62; 
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, supra note 57, at 87–150, 205–43. 
 59 See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2002). 
 60 See generally Asian Agric. Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990), 4 ICSID Rep. 246 (1997). For more on the relevance of 
this case, see Joost Pauwelyn, Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of Inter-
national Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRING-
ING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 11, 25–34 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014) (hereinafter THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW). 
 61 For more on the subject of expropriation in international investment law, see ARNAUD DE 
NANTEUIL, L’EXPROPRIATION INDIRECTE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES INVESTISSEMENTS 
(2014); LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, supra note 56; SUZY NIKIÈMA, L’EXPROPRIATION INDIRECTE EN 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES INVESTISSEMENTS (2012); ROBERT-CUENDET, supra note 56. 
 62 For further discussion on FET, see ALEXANDRA DIEHL, THE CORE STANDARD OF INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION: FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2012); ROLAND KLÄ-
GER, ‘FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2011); MAR-
TINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT (2013) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM]; IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(2008). 
 63 For more on the history of FET, see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 283–91 (2017); Nicolas Angelet, Fair 
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Until 2000, however, FET was regarded as little more than a statement 
of purpose of the host-state towards the foreign investor, rather than a prop-
er legal protection with a concrete content. Since then, non-compliance with 
the FET clause has become the most alleged breach in ISDS.64 Arbitral pan-
                                                                                                                           
and Equitable Treatment, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, § 9; Rudolf Dolzer, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L LAW. 87, 89 
(2005) [hereinafter Dolzer, FET: A Key]; Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Judicially 
Manageable Criteria, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ÉCONOMIQUE À L’AUBE DU XXIÈME SIÈ-
CLE: EN HOMMAGE AUX PROFESSEURS DOMINIQUE CARREAU ET PATRICK JUILLARD 83, 84–86 
(Jean-Marc Sorel ed., 2009) [hereinafter Dolzer, FET: Judicially Manageable Criteria]; Ioana 
Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Right Norms, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 310, 311–16 (Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 357, 357–59 (2005); Thomas Westcott, Recent Practice on Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 409, 410–11 (2007); Kenneth Vandevelde, A 
Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 43, 44–49 (2010) 
[hereinafter Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of FET]; Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 70 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 
107–30 (2000); Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in ARBITRATION 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 385, 386–87 
(Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) [hereinafter Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard]; Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, 
in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, supra  note 57, at 111–12 [hereinafter Yannaca-
Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments]; ALVAREZ, supra note 52, at 187–88; BONNITCHA, 
supra note 52, at 143–44; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 334; DIEHL, supra note 62, at 313–15; 
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 130–32; ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 
137–39; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 255–56; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 218–
20; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 1–4, 15, 19–20, 36–39, 45–46; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 
supra note 57, at 195–202; cf. THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 84–96. 
 64 See e.g., Emilio Agustín Mafezzini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Award, ¶ 83 (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Cana-
da, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 262–266 (Nov. 13, 2000) 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001); Metalclad 
Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/7, Award, ¶¶ 74–101 (August 30, 
2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002); see also Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment 
Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 953, 961–64 (2006) 
[hereinafter Dolzer, Impact of International Investment Treaties]; Francisco González de Cossío, 
Trato Justo y Equitativo en Arbitraje de Inversion: Un Ejercicio Interpretativo, 39 JURÍDICA 
ANUARIO DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LA UNIVERSIDAD IBEROAMER-
ICANA 277, 277 (2009) [hereinafter de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo]; Jean Kalicki & Suzana 
Medeiros, Fair, Equitable and Ambiguous: What Is Fair and Equitable Treatment in International 
Investment Law?, 22 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 24, 24–41 (2007); J. Roman Picherak, The 
Expanding Scope of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Have Recent Tribunals Gone 
Too Far?, 9 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 255, 255–56 (2008); BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 144–45; 
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 130; DIEHL, supra note 62, at 312–13; NEWCOMBE & 
PARADELL, supra note 57, at 255; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 218–20; SORNARAJAH, supra note 
56, at 349–59; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 202–03; Dolzer, FET: A 
Key, supra note 63, at 87, 94–100; Dolzer, FET: Judicially Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 
83–88; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 151–52; Schreuer, supra note 63, 
at 357, 368–73; Westcott, supra note 63, at 409–10, 415–25; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 385–87; cf. ALVAREZ, supra note 52, at 177, 187–88; TU-
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els in ISDS have construed FET as a proper standard and applied it to the 
most diverse scenarios, without normally offering a specific notion of this 
otherwise undefined conventional standard.65 Instead, arbitrators have de-
cided FET claims on a case-by-case basis. At first, a plain-meaning ap-
proach to this protection was not completely discarded.66 Soon, arbitrators 
realized that the open-ended wording of FET clauses allowed them to iden-
tify different elements composing this standard, which international legal 
scholarship promptly started classifying as distinct principles. The constitu-
tive elements frequently overlap with each other, explaining the fact that 
their individual or collective breach will amount to a violation of an FET 
                                                                                                                           
DOR, supra note 62, at 3–4, 15. On awards finding a breach of the FET, see, for example, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 1, 4–5. 
 65 See Dolzer, FET: Judicially Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 93–94; cf. DOLZER & 
SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 141–44; KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 32–35, 40–47. On FET as a 
standard, see DIEHL, supra note 62, at 8–11, 17–34; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 
255, 261–63, 275–78; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 132–34; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 
111–33; Angelet, supra note 63, §§ 4, 7; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, at 
278–82; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 318–21; cf. KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 122–25. For more 
on the relationship between FET and the international minimum standard of treatment, see ALVA-
REZ, supra note 52, at 182–84, 187–205, 209–27; BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 146–56; 
GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 183–86 (2015); DE 
NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 335–41; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 134–41; ARBITRA-
JE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 141–54; KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 48–88; MCLACHLAN ET 
AL., supra note 63, at 355–57; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 257–61, 263–70, 272–
75, 277–78; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 222–28; SORNARAJAH, supra note 56, at 349–54; BI-
LATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 190–95; Angelet, supra note 63, §§ 8–13, 38; 
Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in Interna-
tional Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 297, 298–302, 317–19 (2005); Dolzer, FET: A 
Key, supra note 63, at 92–93; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, at 282–84; Kal-
icki & Medeiros, supra note 64, at 41–45; Picherak, supra note 64, at 257–72, 285–87; Schreuer, 
supra note 63, at 359–64; Vasciannie, supra note 63, at 104–05; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equita-
ble Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 387–93; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Devel-
opments, supra note 63, at 113–18; Westcott, supra note 63, at 411–12, 427–29; cf. MONTT, supra 
note 53, at 62–74, 298–310, 318–23. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 
62. Departing from most of the doctrine, some authors consider FET to have a customary nature 
distinct from that of the international minimum standard of treatment. A few even claim that FET 
has acquired the status of a general principle of law. See DIEHL, supra note 62, at 125–79, 311–12; 
MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 272–75, 277; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 53–104; Knoll-
Tudor, supra note 63, at 316–18; cf. BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 153; KLÄGER, supra note 62, 
at 261–73; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 270–72; Angelet, supra note 63, § 7; 
Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 231–34.  
 66 See Peter Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor 
Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 531–36 (2006); 
see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 291–92; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, 
at 264–68; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 221–22, 228–31; Choudhury, supra note 65, at 297–98; 
Dolzer, FET: A Key, supra note 63, at 88; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, at 
278; Picherak, supra note 64, at 260–65; Schreuer, supra note 63, at 364–67; Vasciannie, supra 
note 63, at 102–05; cf. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 313–24, 327–28; KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 40–
47, 59–61. With regard to FET and justice, see KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 129–53. 
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clause.67 Surprisingly, these principles offer a marked similarity with those 
proposed by GAL. Yet, is this affinity due to the influence of this school of 
thought, or a mere coincidence? 
Unlike national and MFN treatment, FET is a generally absolute or 
non-contingent standard, such that it is one with its own normative content, 
whose exact meaning depends on the circumstances in which it is applied.68 
As classified by international law scholars, the main elements or principles 
of FET include the following duties, generally known as: due process; arbi-
trariness; non-discrimination; vigilance; legitimate expectations; stability 
and predictability; transparency; good faith; and, lately, proportionality. 
Each of these duties requires a short explanation. Due process is a basic 
requirement of the rule of law. Its violation constitutes the international 
wrongful act of denial of justice. This duty may be breached by the judici-
ary, as well as by the executive.69 The obligation of due process is closely 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 156–227; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 340–56; 
DIEHL, supra note 62, at 328–30, 338–502; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 141–60; 
ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 154–67; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 295–
317; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 275–98; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 228–43; 
SORNARAJAH, supra note 56, at 354–59; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 154–81; Angelet, supra note 
63, §§ 14–28; Choudhury, supra note 65, at 302–17; Dolzer, FET: A Key, supra note 63, at 87–88, 
94–100; Dolzer, FET: Judicially Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 88–95; de Cossío, Trato 
Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, at 285–93; Kalicki & Medeiros, supra note 64, at 45–52; Knoll-
Tudor, supra note 63, at 321–35; Picherak, supra note 64, at 270–85; Schreuer, supra note 63, at 
364–67, 373–85; Westcott, supra note 63, at 414–26; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment Standard, supra note 63, at 393–409; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, 
supra note 63, at 118–29; cf. ALVAREZ, supra note 52, at 205–06, 207–17; KLÄGER, supra note 
62, at 115–21, 154–257, 273–80; THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 99–100, 210–
16, 238–59; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 202–12, 234–43, 402–04, 509–
15; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 155–70. See generally Vandevelde, A 
Unified Theory of FET, supra note 63. 
 68 See ALVAREZ, supra note 52, at 206, 209; DIEHL, supra note 62, at 8–11, 29–30; DOLZER 
& SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 132–34; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 11–13; SALA-
CUSE, supra note 56, at 220–21; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 2; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 
supra note 57, at 190–91; Angelet, supra note 63, §§ 3, 34; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, 
supra note 64, at 282; Vasciannie, supra note 63, at 105–07; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 385; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, 
supra note 63, at 111; cf. KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 303–05. 
 69 See KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 118, 213–27; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 157–63; cf. DIEHL, 
supra note 62, at 431–503; THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 204–16, 250–51. 
On due process in FET, see DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 341–45; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra 
note 57, at 154–56; ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 159–63; MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
supra note 63, at 272, 317–322, 356; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 241–43; SORNARAJAH, supra 
note 56, at 357–59; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 509–15; Angelet, supra 
note 63, §§ 16–19, 21–22, 36; Choudhury, supra note 65, at 305–08; Dolzer, FET: Judicially 
Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 92–93; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, 
at 288–90; Kalicki & Medeiros, supra note 64, at 48–52; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbi-
tration, supra note 55, at 238–40; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 322–25; Schill, Fair and Equita-
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connected to the concept of arbitrariness.70 Due process is also related with 
the duty of non-discrimination.71 Sometimes mentioned as obligation of 
vigilance, due diligence is a vital part of the FET standard that links to the 
requirement of reasonableness.72 
The respect of legitimate expectations has gradually emerged as one of 
the main constitutive elements of FET. In this regard, the specific treatment 
expected by the foreign investor must be based on the host-state’s legal 
framework, or on an undertaking made either explicitly or implicitly.73 This 
duty to respect legitimate expectations generally adopts the form of an obli-
gation of consistent conduct by the authorities of the country in which the 
                                                                                                                           
ble Treatment, supra note 55, at 166–67; Schreuer, supra note 63, at 381–83; Vandevelde, A Uni-
fied Theory of FET, supra note 63, at 49–50, 89–96; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment Standard, supra note 63, at 394–96; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, 
supra note 63, at 119–20; see also CHARLES KOTUBY & LUKE SOBOTA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND NORMS APPLICABLE IN TRANSNA-
TIONAL DISPUTES 54–86 (2017); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
38–53, 57–73 (2005); cf. BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 157–58, 194–210, 288–98. 
 70 Arbitrariness is defined in the ELSI case, which ultimately followed the Neer claim: i.e. an 
act that shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) 
(U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, Judgment, ¶ 128 (July 20, 1989); see also KLÄGER, supra note 62, 
at 117, 187–97; THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 239–43; TUDOR, supra note 62, 
at 177–80; cf. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 448–53. For more on arbitrariness in FET, see Choudhury, 
supra note 65, at 311–14; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 345–46; ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, 
supra note 56, at 154–57; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 322–27; SALACUSE, supra note 
56, at 238–41; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 177–80; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 
57, at 202–09; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, at 285–87; Kalicki & Medeiros, 
supra note 64, at 48–52; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 333–35; Schill, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, supra note 55, at 167–68; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 
supra note 63, at 408–09; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, supra note 63, at 
120–21. See generally Jacob Stone, Arbitrariness, the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 
and the International Law of Investment, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 77 (2012). 
 71 See KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 117, 187–97; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 177–80; cf. THE 
INTERNATIONAL MINIMU, supra note 62, at 245–47. With regard to non-discrimination in FET, 
see BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 158–60; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 346–47; ARBITRAJE 
DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 158–59; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 322–27; NEW-
COMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 289–91; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 238–41; BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 202–09, 392–95; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, 
supra note 64, at 288; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 333–35; Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of 
FET, supra note 63, at 52, 63–66; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, supra 
note 63, at 408–09; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, supra note 63, at 120–
21. 
 72 See TUDOR, supra note 62, at 2, 156–57. On the obligation of vigilance in FET, see AR-
BITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 165–66; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra note 
64, at 292–93; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 322; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra 
note 63, at 407–08; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, supra note 63, at 118–
19; cf. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of FET, supra note 63, at 54–63. See generally Eric De 
Brabandere, Host States’ Due Diligence Obligations in International Investment Law, 42 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 319 (2015). 
 73 See KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 164–87; cf. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 387–411, 429–30. 
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investment was made. In practice, problems do not so much arise from 
changes in host-state legislation, but from inconsistent positions taken by 
organs of the executive. In any case, this is not an absolute obligation: it 
does not amount to a freezing of the host-state’s legal system in the inves-
tor’s benefit. A reasonable evolution of the correspondent domestic law is 
part of what the investor must legitimately expect.74 This explains why the 
failure to provide a stable and predictable legal and administrative frame-
work can amount a violation of the FET standard.75 The obligation of trans-
parency is thus also related with the respect for legitimate expectations, as it 
requires host-states to have a clear and unambiguous system of law and ad-
ministration, easily accessible to foreign investors.76 Good faith is a general 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See TUDOR, supra note 62, at 2, 163–68; cf. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 338–61; THE INTER-
NATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 251–59. Concerning legitimate expectations in FET, see 
DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 352–56; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 145–49, 152–
54; ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 157–58; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 
279–80, 314–17, 356; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 279–89; SALACUSE, supra 
note 56, at 231–37; SORNARAJAH, supra note 56, at 354–57; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 163–68; 
Angelet, supra note 63, §§ 6, 23–26; Choudhury, supra note 65, at 308–11; Dolzer, FET: Judi-
cially Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 89–91; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, supra 
note 64, at 287–88; Kalicki & Medeiros, supra note 64, at 45–48; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-
State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 236–38; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 326–29; Picherak, 
supra note 64, at 272–78; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 163–66; 
Schreuer, supra note 63, at 374–80; Westcott, supra note 63, at 414–15; Yannaca-Small, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 396–407; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent 
Developments, supra note 63, at 124–26; see also MONTT, supra note 53, at 222–27, 359–66; 
BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 167–94, 275–88; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 
57, at 234–43; Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of FET, supra note 63, at 51, 66–83. See generally 
Michele Potestá, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and 
the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 88 (2013); Elizabeth 
Snodgrass, Protecting Investor’s Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a General 
Principle, 21 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1 (2006). 
 75 See DIEHL, supra note 62, at 366–87; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 169–72. With regard to 
stability and predictability in FET, see DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 145–49; AR-
BITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 165; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 279–80, 
314–15; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 295–96; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 169–72; 
Angelet, supra note 63, §§ 23, 26–28; Dolzer, FET: A Key, supra note 63, at 90–91; Dolzer, FET: 
Judicially Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 94–95; de Cossío, Trato Justo y Equitativo, 
supra note 64, at 291–92; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 234–
36; Picherak, supra note 64, at 278–82; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 
160–62; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 396–98; 
Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, supra note 63, at 121–23; cf. BONNITCHA, 
supra note 52, at 184–90.  
76 See KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 118, 227–35; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 175–77; cf. DIEHL, 
supra note 62, at 441–47; THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 247–50. For more on 
transparency in FET, see Choudhury, supra note 65, at 302–05; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 
349–52; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 149–52; ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 
56, at 163–65; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 320–22; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra 
note 57, at 291–94; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 175–77; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 237–38; BI-
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principle of law requiring parties to a legal transaction to deal honestly and 
fairly with each other. Among other things, this means acting reasonably, 
taking into account the expectations of others and truthfully disclosing mo-
tives and intentions.77 Bad faith, coercion, threats and harassment can lead 
to a violation of the FET standard.78 Arbitral practice, however, shows that 
the breach of this clause does not require mala fides.79 In tandem with an-
other of its constitutive elements, compliance with FET may also depend on 
the violation of domestic law by host-states, for instance, by their judiciary 
or administrative agencies.80  
                                                                                                                           
LATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 402–04; Angelet, supra note 63, §§ 23, 26; 
Dolzer, FET: Judicially Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 91–92; de Cossío, Trato Justo y 
Equitativo, supra note 64, at 290–91; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 
55, at 241–42; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 332–33; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, su-
pra note 55, at 168–69; Schreuer, supra note 63, at 374–80; Picherak, supra note 64, at 282–85; 
Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of FET, supra note 63, at 52, 83–88; Yannaca-Small, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 396–98; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent 
Developments, supra note 63, at 121–23; cf. BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 204–05, 207–08. 
 77 See TUDOR, supra note 62, at 173–75; cf. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 348–58; KLÄGER, supra 
note 62, at 129–32; THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 243–45. For more regard-
ing good faith in FET, see BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 160–61; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 
347–48; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 156–60; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 
57, at 277, 294–95; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 243; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 173–75; 
Choudhury, supra note 65, at 315–16; Schreuer, supra note 63, at 383–85; Dolzer, FET: Judicial-
ly Manageable Criteria, supra note 63, at 88–89; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 331–32; 
Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 397; cf. BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 209–11; Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of FET, supra 
note 63, at 96–101. With regard to good faith in contractual relations, see Markus Kotzur, Good 
Faith (Bona fide), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, §§ 1–21, 25–26; KOTUBY & 
SOBOTA, supra note 69, at 88–107. 
 78 See KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 187–97; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 169; cf. DIEHL, supra 
note 62, at 447–48. For more on bad faith, coercion, threats and harassment in FET, see DE NAN-
TEUIL, supra note 57, at 348–9; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 159–60; ARBITRAJE DE 
INVERSIÓN, supra note 56, at 157; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 322, 325–27; NEW-
COMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 294–95; Angelet, supra note 63, § 20; de Cossío, Trato 
Justo y Equitativo, supra note 64, at 287; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 329, 331–32; Schreuer, 
supra note 63, at 380–81, 383–85; cf. SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 243. See generally Deyan 
Draguiev, Bad Faith Conduct of States in Violation of the ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ Stand-
ard in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 273 (2014).  
 79 See ALVAREZ, supra note 52, at 206; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 326–27; 
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 277; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 243; TUDOR, supra 
note 62, at 173–75; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 211; Knoll-Tudor, su-
pra note 63, at 331–32; Schreuer, supra note 63, at 383–85; Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of 
FET, supra note 63, at 55, 97; Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, supra 
note 63, at 397. 
 80 See BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 203–04; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 347–48; 
Choudhury, supra note 65, at 314–15; Dolzer, FET: A Key, supra note 63, at 92; Kingsbury & 
Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 240; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 329–30; 
see also MONTT, supra note 53, at 200–05, 310–17; cf. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
supra note 55, at 162–63. 
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Finally, and more recently, proportionality has been included as anoth-
er principle of FET. As a tool for reviewing state conduct, the proportionali-
ty analysis is aimed at assessing how the ends pursued by a public policy 
relate with the means chosen to achieve that result, so as to avoid them be-
ing excessive. For that purpose, it is comprised of three sub-principles, re-
quiring state measures to be: appropriate to their legitimate objectives (suit-
ability), the least burdensome possible on the affected persons (necessity), 
and respect a fair or reasonable balance between the community interests 
and individual rights involved (proportionality stricto sensu).81 Originating 
in German constitutional law, proportionality has reached ISDS mainly via 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 1 of the 
First Optional Protocol of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which has focused on proportionality 
stricto sensu.82 In FET case law, proportionality is sometimes associated 
with the respect of the investors’ legitimate expectations and with reasona-
bleness in the conduct of states. In ISDS, arbitrators have normally stressed 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, supra note 56, at 192–93; CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONAL-
ITY AND DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
AND REGULATORY AUTONOMY 23–29, 53–67 (2015); see also BÜCHELER, supra note 65, at 1–2, 
37; ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL, supra note 53, at 195–98; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State 
Arbitration, supra note 55, at 260–62; Kingsbury & Schill, Public Law Concepts, supra note 55, 
at 85–88; Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 111–13 (2012); Valentina Vadi, 
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas to Regional and International Economic Law: The Case of 
Proportionality, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 557, 568–70 (2015) [hereinafter Vadi, Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas]; cf. KULICK, supra note 33, at 186–92; Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, 
Proportionality: WTO Law: In Comparative Perspective, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 371, 388–98 (2007); 
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74–77 (2008).  
 82 See LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, supra note 56, at 192–93. The same is true for the application of 
this principle in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights. See generally Sebastián López Escarcena, La Propiedad 
y su Privación o Restricción en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana, 21 IUS ET PRAXIS 
531 (2015). For more concerning proportionality in comparative and international law, see 
BÜCHELER, supra note 65, at 28–83; DIEHL, supra note 62, at 333–35; HENCKELS, supra note 81, 
at 45–68; KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 69, at 114–19; KULICK, supra note 33, at 173–83; 
Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 250–76; Sweet & Mathews, 
supra note 81, at 73–74, 97–164; Kingsbury & Schill, Public Law Concepts, supra note 55, at 79–
85; see also Andenas & Zleptnig, supra note 81, at 382–404, 408–24. See generally Eric Engle, 
The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, 10 DARTMOUTH L.J. 1 
(2012); Vadi, Migration of Constitutional Ideas, supra note 81. With regard to proportionality in 
investment treaty arbitration, see BÜCHELER, supra note 65, at 122–300; HENCKELS, supra note 
81, at 70–168, 172–90; KULICK, supra note 33, at 183–85; ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL, supra 
note 53, at 198–207; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 262–76; 
Kingsbury & Schill, Public Law Concepts, supra note 55, at 88–102; Leonhardsen, supra note 81, 
at 111–36; Vadi, Migration of Constitutional Ideas, supra note 81, at 577–83. 
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one of the sub-principles of proportionality over the others, without explic-
itly identifying any of them.83 
IV. THANKS TO GAL OR OUT OF NECESSITY? 
FET is an abstract legal standard whose concrete normative content 
will depend on the facts of the investment dispute in which it is applied.84 
Some scholars agree that, as its name suggests, this standard is essentially 
concerned with the host-state’s decision-making process of the executive, 
legislative or judicial powers, rather than with protecting substantive rights 
of the foreign investor.85 In principle, this is a useful distinction. By restrict-
ing the arbitral review on FET to procedural issues, this approach is less 
intrusive of the host-states’ sovereignty.86 Nonetheless, the nature of FET 
can only generally be described as procedural because the application of 
this distinction to some of its constitutive elements raises concerns. For ex-
ample, denial of justice can be understood as having both an adjective and a 
substantive meaning.87 Arbitrariness, on the other hand, may exceed proce-
                                                                                                                           
 83 See KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 118–19, 235–48; cf. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 335–37. For 
more on proportionality in FET, see MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 206, 234–35, 243–45; 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 57, at 212; THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, supra 
note 62, at 90; Angelet, supra note 63, § 6; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra 
note 55, at 243, 271–74; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 169–70; 
Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, supra note 63, at 403–07; Yannaca-
Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, supra note 63, at 126–29; see also BÜCHELER, supra 
note 65, at 182–210; Kingsbury & Schill, Public Law Concepts, supra note 55, at 96–98; cf. BON-
NITCHA, supra note 52, at 215–27, 298–314; MONTT, supra note 53, at 206–22, 351–58. 
 84 In other words, FET does not empower international arbitral tribunals to decide ex aequo et 
bono. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 139–41; ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN, supra note 
56, at 146–47; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 275–78; Angelet, supra note 63, § 4; 
Kalicki & Medeiros, supra note 64, at 25–26; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 63, at 318–21; Muchlinski, 
supra note 66, at 530–31; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 151–52; 
Schreuer, supra note 63, at 364–67; see also DIEHL, supra note 62, at 8–11, 29–30; DOLZER & 
SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 132–34; TUDOR, supra note 62, at 116–19, 123–32; Dolzer, FET: A 
Key, supra note 63, at 88; Yannaca-Small, FET Standard: Recent Developments, supra note 63, at 
111. 
 85 See, e.g., MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 11–12, 296, 355–56; Angelet, supra note 
63, §§ 2, 15, 21; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 243–47; Schill, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 181–82. 
 86 For other benefits of following the distinction between procedure and substance in compar-
ative due process of law, see, for example, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, supra note 24, at 7–8; Cana-
nea, supra note 24, at 57–58. For more on the standards of review and deference in international 
adjudication, see, for example, HENCKELS, supra note 81, at 29–43. 
 87 See, e.g., BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 161–64, 201–23; Schill, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, supra note 55, at 159–60, 166–67; cf. MONTT, supra note 53, at 348–51; THE INTER-
NATIONAL MINIMUM, supra note 62, at 71–73, 189–97, 210–16. But see DE NANTEUIL, supra note 
57, at 342–44; DIEHL, supra note 62, at 455–67, 503; KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 213–27; PAULS-
SON, supra note 69, at 57–59, 73–84, 87–90. 
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dural fairness if linked with the principles of rationality and reasonable-
ness.88 Moreover, the claim that FET is mostly related with the decision-
making process of host-states depends on the exceptional application of the 
proportionality analysis to this standard because this principle does involve 
a substantive review of the host-states’ conduct.89 
Incidentally, some of the constitute elements of FET have found con-
ventional support in state practice.90 For instance, the latest version of the 
US BIT expressly declares that FET “includes the obligation not to deny 
justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in ac-
cordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal 
systems of the world.”91 Exceptionally, the treaties of other states also in-
clude this phrase, with slight variations.92 But it is not only BITs that add 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See, e.g., BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 161–64, 210–23; cf. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, 
supra note 57, at 250–51; Stone, supra note 70, at 89–90; Vadi, Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 
supra note 81, at 573–83. 
 89 See BONNITCHA, supra note 52, at 161–64, 210–27, 298–314; KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 
118–19, 235–56; see also DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 341–45; HENCKELS, supra note 81, at 
70–75; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 255, 275–78; Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-
State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 243; Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 55, at 
154–55, 169–70. 
 90 With regard to FET in recent investment treaties, see Eric De Brabandere, States’ Reasser-
tion of Control Over International Investment Law: (Re)Defining ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ 
and ‘Indirect Expropriation’, in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY 
REGIME 285 (Andreas Kulick ed., 2017). 
 91 U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 5(2)(a), https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZG4-37GL]. This declara-
tion was already incorporated into an earlier version of the US Model BIT and into its FTAs as of 
2003. See Free Trade Agreement art. 10.4(2)(a), U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file1_4004.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZC3-
VYLU]; Free Trade Agreement art. 15.5(2)(a), U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf [https://perma.cc/H28C-
Z25R]. See generally Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment art. 5(2)(a), U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101, https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/183240.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7SX-32AZ]. 
 92 The same phrase can be found, for example, in Colombia’s Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty from 2007. REPUBLIC OF COLOM., MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 3(4)(c) 
(2007). From 2007 onwards, Colombia has included this declaration in some of its BITs. See, e.g., 
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 4(2), Japan-Colom., Sept. 12, 2011, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/797 [https://perma.cc/YFE6-LSUG]; Bilateral Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 2(4)(b), U.K.-Colom., Mar. 10, 2010, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3253 [https://perma.cc/QU5C-2VB6]; Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty art. 3(4)(a), Colom.-India, Nov. 10, 2009, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/796 [https://perma.cc/P9LV-26XB]; Bilateral Investment Treaty 
art. 2(4)(c), China-Colom., Nov. 22, 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/720 [https://perma.cc/E336-AN4R]; Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 4(2)(a), Colom.-Peru, 
Dec. 11, 2007, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/798 [https://perma.cc/
J28P-9JFY]. The BITs of other states sometimes have a similar wording in their FET clauses. See, 
e.g., Free Trade Agreement art. 12.4(2)(a), Hond.-Peru, May 29, 2015, http://investmentpolicy
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this statement. The Japan-Mongolia Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-Hong Kong 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), among others, incorpo-
rate this declaration.93 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between Canada and the European Union (CETA) goes further, stating that: 
A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment 
referenced in paragraph 1 if a measure or series of measures con-
stitutes: 
 (a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceed-
ings; 
 (b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamen-
tal breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceed-
ings; 
 (c) manifest arbitrariness; 
 (d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, 
such as gender, race or religious belief; 
 (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and 
harassment; or 
 (f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable 
treatment obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of this Article.94 
                                                                                                                           
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5341 [https://perma.cc/D9RQ-5U3F]; Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 2.3(a), Korea-Kenya, July 8, 2014, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5261 [https://perma.cc/AT5U-HHQE]. 
 93 See Closer Economic Partnership Agreement art. 4(2)(i), China-H.K., June 28, 2017, 
https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/files/cepa14_main.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVU3-YC2C]; 
Trans Pacific Partnership art. 9.6(2)(a), Feb. 4, 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/3573 [https://perma.cc/DB7F-KJDN]; Agreement for an Economic Partner-
ship art. 10.5(1) note 2, Japan-Mong., Feb. 10, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/3372 [https://perma.cc/GF56-XAMR]; see also Free Trade Agreement art. 
10.7(2)(a), Korea-N.Z., Mar. 23, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/3592 [https://perma.cc/VE7A-HLMC]; Free Trade Agreement art. 11.5(2)(a), Austl.-Korea, 
Apr. 8, 2014, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2971 [https://perma.cc/
E8QV-4UQE]; Free Trade Agreement art. 10.5(2)(a), Mex.-Pan., Apr. 3, 2014, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5579 [https://perma.cc/FXG5-TXZC]; Economic 
Partnership Agreement art. 9.7(2)(a), Sing.-Taiwan, Nov. 7, 2013, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5584 [https://perma.cc/4ZUY-PQYQ]; Free Trade Agreement art. 
805(2), Can.-Colom., Nov. 21, 2008, http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-colombie/fta-ale/08.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/3X2K-
V796]. 
 94 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 8.10, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016, http://ec.
europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ [https://perma.cc/Y7E8-ML2G] [here-
inafter CETA]; cf. Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation art. 
14(2), Viet.-E.U., June 27, 2012, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3244 
 
2710 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2685 
Moreover, CETA declares that “[w]hen applying the above fair and 
equitable treatment obligation, the Tribunal may take into account whether 
a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a covered 
investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the inves-
tor relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that 
the Party subsequently frustrated.”95 The objective of incorporating these 
statements in FET clauses is none other than to guide the interpretation of 
these provisions by decision-makers. In the case of CETA, if mentioning 
due process, arbitrariness, non-discrimination and legitimate expectations 
was not enough, the same provision then adds “[f]or greater certainty” that 
“a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate interna-
tional agreement,” on one hand, and “the fact that a measure breaches do-
mestic law,” on the other, does not “in and of itself” establish a violation of 
this article.96 In this regard, CETA ends up declaring that “[t]he Parties shall 
regularly, or upon request of a Party, review the content of the obligation to 
provide fair and equitable treatment.”97 
Can any of these judicial and conventional developments of FET be at-
tributed to the GAL Project? Not really. First, several of the constitute ele-
ments of this standard can already be found in the ISDS case law that pre-
ceded the publication of the Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart’s GAL mani-
festo or Cassese’s Oltre lo Stato. And, second, it is pointless to look for ref-
erences to the main authors of this school in subsequent judicial decisions 
because arbitrators in investment disputes tend to rely on international case 
law, when available. Decision-makers and state officers have taken the con-
stitutive elements of this standard of treatment, mostly, from comparative 
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/8M7K-TT6A]. Neither of these treaties has been entered into force. For more on 
CETA and FET, see BÜCHELER, supra note 65, at 183–86; Armand de Mestral, When Does the 
Exception Become the Rule? Conserving Regulatory Space Under CETA, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
641, 641–45, 647–54 (2015); Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through 
Greater Precision in Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 
28–40 (2016); Ursula Kriebaum, FET and Expropriation in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT, 15 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 454, 454–56, 468–82 (2014). For more concerning CETA, the EU-
Vietnam FTA and FET, see Gus Van Harten, The European Union’s Emerging Approach to ISDS: 
A Review of the Canada-Europe CETA, Europe-Singapore FTA, and Europe-Vietnam FTA, 1 U. 
BOLOGNA L.R. 138, 154–57 (2016). 
 95 CETA, supra note 94, art. 8.10(4); cf. Viet.-E.U., supra note 94, art. 14(6). 
 96 CETA, supra note 94, arts. 8.10(6), 8.10(7); cf. Viet.-E.U., supra note 94, art. 14(7). 
 97 CETA, supra note 94, art. 8.10(3). With regard to reassertion of control over investment 
treaties, see the contributions of Martins Paparinskis, Mavluda Sattorova, Elini Methymaki and 
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Ruminana Yotova, and Nikos Lavranos in REASSERTION OF CONTROL 
OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME (Andreas Kulick ed., 2016). 
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public law. Analogies are frequently used in ISDS.98 Arbitrators tend to re-
sort to their own legal background when fulfilling their decision-making 
duties, and engage in judicial dialogue with other international tribunals; 
sometimes, even with domestic courts.99 In this way, ISDS becomes a de 
facto or soft precedent. Without being binding on third parties to a particu-
lar dispute, judicial decisions in investment treaty arbitrations operate as 
authoritative legal statements that strongly influence future case law, pro-
gressively shaping the outcomes of ISDS.100 Should we thank or blame 
GAL for this? Again, there is no clear answer. GAL has been more success-
ful in describing phenomena than in prescribing principles for what they 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See generally Martins Paparinskis, Analogies and Other Regimes of International Law, in 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 60, at 73; Vadi, Migration 
of Constitutional Ideas, supra note 81. 
 99 Even though this is a common phenomenon in comparative and international law, the name 
judicial dialogue has mostly been used in the context of human rights law. See generally PAOLA 
ANDREA ACOSTA ALVARADO, DIÁLOGO JUDICIAL Y CONSTITUCIONALISMO MULTINIVEL: EL 
CASO INTERAMERICANO (2015); LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN, EL DIÁLOGO JUDICIAL: MÁ-
XIMO DESAFÍO DE LOS TIEMPOS JURÍDICOS MODERNOS (2013); Sabrina Ragone, Las Relaciones 
de los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros con el Tribunal de Justicia y con el 
Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos: Una Propuesta de Clasificación, in DIÁLOGO JURIS-
PRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera Garcia 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS]; Javier Garcia 
Roca, El diálogo entre el Tribunal de Derechos Humanos, los Tribunales Constitucionales y otros 
órganos jurisdiccionales en el espacio convencional europeo, in DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN 
DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra. Valentina Vadi calls it “judicial borrowing.” See ANALOGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 53, at 88–110, 138–64; see also DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 
131–34. 
 100 ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 93–99 (2014); Florian Grisel, The Sources of International Investment Law, in THE FOUN-
DATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 60, at 223–33; ALVAREZ, supra note 
52, at 231–35; DE NANTEUIL, supra note 57, at 125–31; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 
33–34; KLÄGER, supra note 62, at 34–38; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 87–91; MONTT, 
supra note 53, at 20, 107, 113; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 59–61, 102–07; ROB-
ERT-CUENDET, supra note 56, at 5–6; THE MULTILATERALIZATION, supra note 55, at 321–39; 
Kingsbury & Schill, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 221–23; Schill, System-Building, 
supra note 55, at 1094–108. See generally Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014 (2007); Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration. A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L 
ARB. 129 (2007); Judith Gill, Is There a Special Role for Precedent in Investment Arbitration?, 25 
ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 87 (2010); Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by Interna-
tional Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5 (2011); Marc Jacob, Precedents: 
Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1005 (2011); Lucy Reed, The 
De Facto Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case Management, 
25 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 95 (2010); Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doc-
trine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1189 
(Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). For more on the use of precedents in international law from 
the standpoint of IPA, see ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME?: A PUB-
LIC LAW THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 115–19 (2014). 
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call the global administrative space. For example, Cassese claimed in 2010 
that, “[a] global administrative law has thus developed, in terms of which 
global regimes are encouraged, and sometimes compelled, to ensure and 
promote the rule of law and procedural fairness, transparency, participation, 
and the duty to give reasons throughout all areas of their activity.”101 This is 
an accurate portrayal of FET, which has been gradually transformed by 
ISDS case law from a rather empty declaration of good intentions to an es-
sential standard of treatment of BITs and EIAs embodying the rule of law—
in the form of an overarching duty of procedural fairness favoring aliens 
that qualify as investors of the other state party to the correspondent trea-
ty.102 The constitutive elements or principles of FET allow decision-makers 
to apply a clause conventionally devoid of meaning, keeping in mind the 
ultimate goal of international investment law: promoting foreign investment 
by protecting aliens in host-states. How? By offering good governance to 
foreign investors in the form of a clear, stable and predictable legal and ad-
ministrative framework implemented by host-states in a transparent and 
coherent manner.103 From this perspective, investment treaties are nothing 
less than instruments of self-discipline and dispute avoidance.104 
Some scholars have rightly claimed that the constitutive elements of 
FET materialize the rule of law principles that are inherent to investment 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Cassese, Is There a GAL?, supra note 54, at 774. 
 102 In this regard, Martins Paparinskis’ observations on the interpretative “road[s] not taken” 
by arbitrators when dealing with FET are quite interesting. See THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM, 
supra note 62, at 112–20. 
 103 See LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, supra note 56, at 7, 114, 195–96, 200, 203–04, 210–11, 228; see 
also DIEHL, supra note 62, at 8–11, 243–49, 328–37; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 57, at 20–
27; SALACUSE, supra note 56, at 6–9, 109–11, 114; BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra 
note 57, at 1–4, 11; THE MULTILATERALIZATION, supra note 55, at 4–6; Angelet, supra note 63, 
§ 5; Dolzer, Impact of International Investment Treaties, supra note 64, at 953–56, 970–72; Ru-
dolf Dolzer, The European Approach to BITs, 24 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 368, 369 
(2009); Jan Paulsson, The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners, 1 J. INT’L 
DISP. SETTLEMENT 341, 346–47, 349 (2010); Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 
55, at 176–81; Stone, supra note 70, at 77–78; Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of FET, supra note 
63, at 49–53; Kenneth Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The 
Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 522–25 (1998); Kenneth 
Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Way Forward, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 307, 
313–14 (2011) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment]; James Zhan, The Spread of 
BITs and Their Changing Face, 24 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 339, 339 (2009); cf. BONNI-
TCHA, supra note 52, at 39–45, 133–39; DIEHL, supra note 62, at 336; Kingsbury & Schill, Inves-
tor-State Arbitration, supra note 55, at 221–23. But see MONTT, supra note 53, at 74–80, 125–61, 
165–229. See generally Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the 
Rule of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1147 (2014).  
 104 See Paulsson, supra note 103, at 346; see also DIEHL, supra note 62, at 359–60; SALA-
CUSE, supra note 56, at 114; THE MULTILATERALIZATION, supra note 55, at 4–6. 
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treaties.105 Schill argued that the underlying assumption of this approach is 
that FET is a standard that has a normative meaning that differs from other 
protections offered by investment treaties.106 In his view: 
Understanding fair and equitable treatment in such a fashion at-
tributes to the standard a quasi-constitutional function that serves 
as a yardstick for the exercise of the host states’ administrative, 
judicial, and legislative activity vis-à-vis foreign investors. In this 
perspective, arbitral jurisprudence does not appear as a fragment-
ed and disordered aggregate of awards but as part of the emerging 
global regime governing foreign investments and limiting con-
duct of host states relating to it.107 
Due to FET’s lack of clear prescriptive content, “arbitral tribunals run 
the risk of facing the reproach that they handle the standard as a malleable 
tool of ex post facto control of host states’ measures based on the arbitra-
tors’ personal conviction and understanding about what is fair and equita-
ble.”108 According to Schill, uniting the constitutive elements of FET under 
the concept of rule of law would allow decision-makers to overcome the 
shortcomings of arbitral practice affecting this standard.109 The best way of 
doing this is by applying the proportionality analysis to FET.110 To this end, 
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Schill proposed a mixture of bottom-up and bottom-down approaches, using 
“a comparative law methodology that attempts to extract general principles 
of public law from those domestic and international legal regimes that em-
brace an institutional design prescribing rule of law standards for the exer-
cise of public power in administrative and judicial proceedings and through 
legislation.”111 It should be noticed that Schill considered “the rule of law 
understanding underlying the jurisprudence of investment tribunals,” in its 
core, “as primarily procedural and institutional in nature.”112 
Other authors have also acknowledged the connection between FET 
and the rule of law.113 In Kenneth Vandevelde’s view, for instance, ISDS 
case law has implicitly construed this investment protection as requiring 
treatment in accordance with the rule of law.114 Therefore, he claimed, “the 
concept of legality is the unifying theory behind the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.”115 According to him, international arbitral tribunals 
interpreting FET “have incorporated the procedural and substantive princi-
ples of the rule of law into that standard.”116 That is to say, due process, on 
the one hand, and reasonableness, consistency, non-discrimination and 
transparency, on the other.117 In Vandevelde’s opinion, this approach would 
match the general purpose of investment treaties, which partially subordi-
nate the sovereign’s power to the legal constraints of provisions that reflect 
the principles of the rule of law.118 
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CONCLUSION 
Much like earlier or contemporary academic attempts to replace inter-
national law, GAL offers a refreshing invitation to think outside the box. 
And, as most of these initiatives, GAL has both a descriptive side, and a 
prescriptive one. To the regret of GAL’s supporters, however, the normative 
traction of this doctrine is weak—if existent at all. The central premises of 
GAL are well illustrated by its take on ISDS. But even though the descrip-
tion of the phenomenon and the challenges it poses to international law is 
accurate, the similarity between the principles identified by GAL authors 
and the constitute elements advanced by the ISDS case law on FET is, at 
most, a coincidence. Decision-makers in investment treaty arbitration have 
adopted an administrative stance on this standard, but their mixed bottom-
up/top-down approach is based not on GAL, but on public comparative law, 
and on previous judicial decisions of other international tribunals. Invest-
ment treaties do not define FET, nor mention the rule of law as one of their 
objectives. The generic original purpose of these international agreements 
provides an inkling of how to construe this clause. And what better way to 
promote/protect foreign investment than by building up the rule of law 
across the world? In a way, this has been the main goal of a select group of 
international legal scholars, at least since Kant. Apparently, arbitrators in 
ISDS share this ambition and contribute to it in each of their judicial deci-
sions on FET, transforming otherwise isolated awards in real building 
blocks of this rule of law coming from above, but nurtured from below. 
ISDS has gradually developed common normative principles of an adminis-
trative character, which force those states that are parties to investment trea-
ties to improve the treatment offered to foreign investors, if they want to 
avoid incurring international responsibility. By indirectly importing com-
parative/international principles via transnational judicial law-making, arbi-
trators emerge as true rule-makers. The democratic deficit and lack of ac-
countability this situation entails are evident. In this respect, GAL’s assess-
ment is precise. A solution for it, however, has yet to be found. 
 
 
 
